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Abstract
This paper investigates - on the basis of the Cont-Bouchaud model - whether a Tobin
tax can stabilize foreign exchange markets. Compared to earlier studies, this paper ex-
plicitly recognizes that a transaction tax-induced reduction in market depth may increase
the price responsiveness of a given order. We find that the imposition of a transaction tax
may still achieve a triple dividend: (1) exchange rate fluctuations decrease, (2) currencies
are less mispriced, and (3) central authorities raise substantial tax revenues. However, if
the price impact function is too sensitive with respect to market depth, stabilization may
turn into destabilization.
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1 Introduction
Since the mid 1980s, the daily turnover in financial markets has increased sharply. Moreover,
the trading volume increasingly reflects very short-term and speculative transactions. In for-
eign exchange markets, for example, operations of intraday traders account for 75 percent of
the market volume (Bank for International Settlements 2002). In comparison, only 15 per-
cent of the trading volume is on account of non-financial customers, with international trade
transactions representing merely 1 percent of the total. The fast and hectic trading leads to
complex financial market dynamics. According to Cont (2001) and Lux and Ausloos (2002), the
behavior of financial prices may be characterized by five universal features: (1) the evolution
of the prices shows little pair correlations between successive daily changes, (2) severe bubbles
and crashes occasionally emerge, (3) the prices fluctuate strongly, (4) the distribution of log
price changes possesses fat tails, and (5) periods of low volatility alternate with periods of high
volatility.
Two competing views exist about the efficiency of financial markets. The efficient market
hypothesis states that prices reflect their fundamental values. Thus, the statistical features of
asset price changes are fully explained by those of the underlying fundamental process. For
instance, volatility clustering arises since the intensity of news alternates over time. Extreme
price changes reflect the arrival of very important new information. However, it is hard to
imagine that the aforementioned stylized facts are fully caused by an exogenous news process.
Models with heterogeneous interacting agents seem to describe the working of financial
markets more realistically than the traditional neo-classical paradigm. For instance, in Palmer
et al. (1994), Kirman (1991), Brock and Hommes (1998), Cont and Bouchaud (2000), Lux
and Marchesi (2000), or Farmer and Joshi (2002), the dynamics is mainly driven endogenously
through the activity of boundedly rational speculators. Complicated dynamics may arise due
to non-linear trading strategies, switching between different types of predictors, or social in-
teractions such as herding behavior. Clearly, these models indicate that financial markets may
not be efficient.
If the activity of speculators creates distortions, it is interesting to ask whether there exist
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any means to regulate these markets. Recently, several models with heterogeneous interacting
agents have been applied as computer laboratories to explore whether certain policy measures
may stabilize financial markets. Note that such simulation experiments have the advantage that
they allow the exploration of a certain policy in a well-defined and controlled environment. For
instance, one can control for all kinds of random shocks, measure the policy objectives precisely
and produce as many observations as required.
The focus of this paper is how the Tobin tax affects foreign exchange markets. As early
as 1972, Tobin (1978) suggested imposing a uniform tax of around 1 percent on all currency
transactions in order to curb speculation. Nowadays, a tax rate of between 0.05 and 0.5 per-
cent is being discussed (Eichengreen et al. 1995, Haq et al. 1996, Frankel 1996, Mende and
Menkhoff 2003). Supporters of Tobin’s proposal claim that a transaction tax favors long-term
investments over short-term investments. Note that around 80 percent of the daily speculation
trade takes place because traders would like to take advantage of profits below the 10−3 border.
The effect of a small tax rate could therefore be quite strong. On the other hand, a low tax
rate should not harm firms engaged in international trade. Advocates of the Tobin tax also
argue that such a device could also raise a substantial amount of tax revenues.
Ehrenstein (2003), using the microscopic herding model of Cont and Bouchaud (2000), finds
that a Tobin tax may successfully reduce exchange rate volatility. Moreover, the tax revenue
in some of the model versions is maximized at a tax rate of around 0.5 percent, which sounds
quite realistic. Westerhoff (2003a) develops a simple model with interacting chartists and
fundamentalists. He also reports that a small transaction tax may stabilize foreign exchange
markets. But if the tax rate is too high, i.e. above 1 percent, too many stabilizing fundamental
traders may leave the market and mispricing may increase again. However, both papers have
overlooked an important feedback mechanism which may counter the influence of a Tobin tax.
The reduction in short-term transactions naturally reduces market depth which may, in turn,
increase volatility. Clearly, the price adjustment due to a given order depends on market depth:
The less liquid a market is, the stronger the price responsiveness of a given transaction.
The aim of this paper is to re-examine the effectiveness of the Tobin tax. We use a modified
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version of the Cont-Bouchaud model (2000) in which the communication structure between the
traders is modeled as a random graph. Cont and Bouchaud show that interactions between
market participants through imitation can lead to large fluctuations in aggregate demand. Since
the Cont-Bouchaud model gives a reasonable description of financial markets and is able to gen-
erate realistic price dynamics we feel safe to use it as a computer laboratory. We find that the
imposition of a transaction tax may decrease both volatility and distortions even if a reduction
in market depth increases the price responsiveness of a given trade. Moreover, policy makers
may raise substantial tax revenues. However, if the price impact function is too sensitive with
respect to liquidity, stabilization may turn into destabilization.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly repeats the basic elements of the Cont-
Bouchaud framework. Section 3 presents the experimental design and section 4 summarizes
our main results. The final section concludes the paper.
2 The model of Cont and Bouchaud
The goal of Cont and Bouchaud (2000) is to study the impact of herding behavior among
speculators on asset price dynamics. Let us briefly repeat the model’s main components. We
put our agents onto a randomly occupied square lattice2 since previous work (Stauffer 2001)
showed that the type of the lattice does not matter much. Cont and Bouchaud consider a stock
market with N agents, labeled with an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ N , trading a single asset. During each
time period, the agents have three options: to buy one unit of the asset, to sell one unit of the
asset, or to remain inactive. The demand of agent i in period t is represented by
Di(t) =


+1 : with prob a
−1 : with prob a
0 : otherwise
(1)
2This model is based on the percolation theory. In the percolation theory we start to fill the lattice such that
each site is randomly occupied with probability p and empty with probability (1 − p). Neighboring occupied
sites form clusters. If a contiguous path of occupied sites connects the top and bottom of the lattice for the
first time, the threshold value p= pc is reached.
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where the parameter 0 ≤ a ≤ 0.5 captures the activity of the agents. A value of a < 0.5
obviously allows for a finite fraction of agents not to trade during a given period3. In order to
focus on the effect of herding, Cont and Bouchaud do not explicitly model the decision process
leading to the individual demands. Their random character may, for instance, be due to ran-
dom resources of the agents. Such behavior is often called noise trading.
Aggregate excess demand, i.e. the sum of all orders, is the sole driving force of the asset
price: Excess buying drives up the price and excess selling drives down the price. The price
adjustment is formalized by a log-linear price impact function
P (t+ 1) = P (t) +
1
b
N∑
i=1
Di(t), (2)
where P (t) denotes the log price at time t and b stands for a positive liquidity parameter de-
scribing how much excess demand is needed to move the asset price by one unit. Note that log
price changes and excess demand vary proportionally. Cont and Bouchaud set b= 1.
In real markets, agents may form groups of various sizes which may then share information
and act in coordination4. The agents’ group formation is described through a random match-
ing process. All agents which are direct or indirect neighbours of each other form a cluster
which adopts one common strategy of selling or buying. Each agent has at most four direct
neighbours but a large cluster (= company or coalition) can be formed through the neighbours
of neighbours etc. For an occupation probability p above pc = 0.592746 a cluster connecting
top and bottom is formed; we work at this critical concentration.
The microscopic model of Cont and Bouchaud and its variants have the power to mimic
actual asset price dynamics quite closely (Stauffer 2001). For an activity a close to 0.5 and p=
pc the distribution of the returns is similar to a Gaussian curve. However, for a smaller activity
3We can also interpret activity a as a measure of the length of the time we handle in one iteration. If a is
close to 0.5, we simulate low frequency data since nearly all market participants are active. Otherwise, a small
a reflects high frequency trading since only few agents are active in a given time step.
4If the orders of the agents were independent then the returns would be normally distributed. However, this
is not consistent with the data.
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level, one obtains heavy tails in the distribution of the returns. Moreover, weak correlations
exist between successive returns and strong correlations between successive absolute returns.
Since prices do not react to news, one may also argue that the speculators cause distortions
and excess volatility.
3 Laboratory design
3.1 Modifications
Some adjustments are necessary to be able to study the effectiveness of the Tobin tax within
the Cont-Bouchaud framework.
First, since log-price changes of the Cont-Bouchaud model are often large integers and the
Tobin tax is a very small number (i.e. less than 1 percent), we have to normalize the returns. In
reality, extreme price changes in major foreign exchange markets seldomly exceed the 5 percent
level. Thus, we take here maxwin = 5 percent. This means that if all clusters in an iteration
are active and buying, the return is +5 percent. Otherwise, if all clusters are active and selling,
the return is set to -5 percent. Certainly, not all clusters will trade in the same direction in the
same iteration.
Second, we impose a Tobin tax on all currency transactions. This changes the behavior
of the speculators in the following way. The speculators believe that the log-price change in
period t − 1 is authoritative for the log-price change development in period t. Thus, if the
absolute value of the log-price change is lower than the tax rate, speculation is identified as not
profitable. As a result, speculators become inactive.
Third, we include international trade transactions. The orders of international firms, on
which the Tobin tax has no impact, consist of two elements: An unsystematic random compo-
nent and a systematic deterministic component. The unsystematic component reflects random
liquidity needs of the firms, e.g. to pay bills in a foreign currency. This is implemented by
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assuming that 1 percent of all clusters describe the behavior of firms. The systematic compo-
nent is due to current account imbalances. For instance, if the exchange rate is overvalued then
exports exceed imports. The systematic demand of the international firms is given as
∆(t) = (F − P (t− 1))d, (3)
where F is the log of the fundamental value and d is a positive reaction coefficient. According to
(3), current account imbalances increase with the mispricing of the exchange rate. We assume
that F = 0 and d = 0.001, which implies that each day 1/10 of 1 percent of any gap from the
fundamental value dissipates. This translates into a realistic half-life of about 2 years.
Fourth, Cont and Bouchaud assume a proportionality between aggregated excess demand
and log-price changes which is a reasonable approximation as long as the market depth does
not vary too strongly. However, since the Tobin tax may significantly crowd out speculative
transactions, we introduce a non-linear price impact function. In particular, we assume that a
given transaction causes a small (large) price change if market liquidity is high (low). Let e be
the normalization factor to scale the dynamics according to maxwin, then the price adjustment
may be written as
P (t+ 1) = P (t) + A(τ, t)(∆(t) + e
N∑
i=1
Di(t)) (4)
with
A(τ, t) =
f
[
∑τ
k=1 (| ∆(t− k + 1) | +
∑N
i=1 | Di(t− k + 1) |)]
g
. (5)
The exponent g ≥ 0 captures the curvature of the price adjustment while f is a positive shift
parameter. The market depth is given as the sum of all currency transactions within the last τ
trading periods. Note that for g = 0 and f = 1/b, (4) is identical to the price impact function
of the original Cont-Bouchaud model. For g > 0, the price impact of a given order decreases
with increasing liquidity5.
5The non-linearity of the price impact function may create chaotic price dynamics even if the behavior of
speculators is deterministic and linear (Westerhoff 2003b).
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3.2 The algorithm
In a nutshell, the simulations are executed as follows:
• With the algorithm of Hoshen and Kopelman we determine the number of clusters with
s agents.
• We decide randomly if the cluster is active in this iteration.
– If the cluster is active we test whether the condition for profitable speculation is
fulfilled.
∗ If this is the case we decide by another random number if the cluster would like
to buy or sell an amount which corresponds to the size of the cluster.
∗ If the condition is not true we decide through another random number if the
cluster is forced to trade because it belongs to one of the international firms.
· If the cluster is an international firm, we decide randomly whether the cluster
would like to buy or sell.
· If the cluster does not trade it has no impact on the dynamics.
– If the cluster is not active it has no impact on the dynamics.
• If all clusters have been processed we determine the new price and the iteration is finished.
• The procedure is repeated for the next iteration.
3.3 Policy objectives
Before we turn to the simulation results let us first define three important policy objectives. A
high exchange rate variability implies a high risk for internationally operating firms. As is well
known, the higher the exchange rate volatility is, the more strongly risk-averse firms retreat
from international trade, which is bad for the markets. Thus, policy makers have an incentive
to control exchange rate risk. If the exchange rate is misaligned, long-term capital investments
may flow into inefficient sectors. To achieve a good capital allocation, prices should reflect their
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fundamental values closely. Finally, the imposition of a transaction tax generates an additional
source of income. We formalize these criteria as follows. Volatility is computed as
volatility =
1
T
T∑
t=1
| P (t)− P (t− 1) |, (6)
distortion as
distortion =
1
T
T∑
t=1
| P (t)− F |, (7)
and the tax revenue as
revenue = tax[
T∑
t=1
(| ∆(t) | +
N∑
i=1
| Di(t) |)], (8)
where T is the sample length and tax is the tax rate. The simulations are based on T=100,000.
4 Results
We are now ready to explore the impact of the Tobin tax on the dynamics of foreign exchange
markets. We fix the following parameters: N= 570, a= 0.4999, pc= 0.592746, d= 0.001, f= 1.
Figure 1 shows the results for τ = 1, i.e. market liquidity only depends on the actual trading
volume. The first panel of figure 1 displays the reaction of the volatility for g= 0 (the ”+ +
+”-line), g= 0.19 (the ”× × ×”-line) and g= 0.4 (the ”⋆ ⋆ ⋆”-line). The transaction tax is
increased from 0 to 1 percent. As can be seen, volatility decreases, remains constant, or even
increases due to currency taxation6. The second panel of figure 1 reveals similar results for the
distortion. A Tobin tax may help drive prices closer towards fundamentals as long as g is not
too large. For instance, for g= 0, a Tobin tax of 0.2 percent decreases volatility by more than
50 percent and distortion by around 33 percent. Finally, the third panel of figure 1 presents the
income generating potential of the Tobin tax. Up to around g= 0.19, the tax revenue function
has a maximum. For higher values of the exponent, tax revenues increase with increasing tax
rates, at least for tax rates below 1 percent. Note also that the revenue maximizing tax rate
6Note that the three curves do not start at the same point, i.e. g has an impact on the absolute level of the
volatility. However, the shift parameter f allows the rescaling of the starting point such that the curves have
the same origin. Such rescaling does not qualitatively change our results.
9
may not coincide with the volatility minimizing tax rate (e.g. for g= 0). In this sense, policy
makers may set the tax rate too low in order to generate higher tax revenues.
These results deserve further attention. Note first that the Tobin tax may indeed achieve a
triple dividend even if a reduction in market depth increases the price responsiveness of a given
order. This may be regarded as good news for policy makers since it allows them to stabilize
foreign exchange markets and to generate government income. Proponents of the Tobin tax
always have this case in mind. However, our simulations also give a warning to policy mak-
ers: The success of a Tobin tax is not absolutely sure. If the curvature of the price impact
function is too extreme (i.e. g > 0.2), the Tobin tax destabilizes the market in the sense that
both volatility and distortion increase. For g= 0.4, even a minimal tax rate always increases
exchange rate variability. The latter result stands in sharp contrast to earlier findings on the
usefulness of transaction taxes.
Are these estimates robust? Figure 2 displays the results for τ= 20, that is the market depth
is taken as the trading volume over the last 20 observations (now the ”+ + +”-line stands for
g= 0, the ”× × ×”-line for g= 0.2 and the ”⋆ ⋆ ⋆”-line for g= 0.4). Since the model refers
to daily data, 20 observations correspond to a time span of one month. Again, we find that
the Tobin tax is not always stabilizing. However, if market liquidity depends on a longer time
horizon, then the advocates of the Tobin tax have reason to be more optimistic. For g= 0.2, for
instance, we still see a sharp drop in volatility and distortion. Further examinations revealed
that as τ increases further, say up to 50 or 100 trading periods, volatility and distortion de-
crease for much higher values of the exponent g.
5 Conclusions
Short-term speculations generate excess volatility. As a result, financial markets often lack
anchoring in fundamentals. Tobin (1978) thus proposed a levy on all foreign-exchange transac-
tions. The tax should be small enough to be fairly negligible for firms engaged in international
trade, yet wipe out a lot of short-term speculation. Short-term financial round-trip excursions
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amplify even a very low tax rate. For instance, a tax of 0.1 percent, measured in terms of
annualized expected rates of return, would come to a 43 percent7 penalty on one-day specu-
lation. Although the Tobin tax is frequently discussed in the popular media, it has remained
under-researched in academia.
This paper uses the well-known herding model of Cont and Bouchaud to investigate the con-
sequences of a transaction tax on foreign exchange dynamics. In contrast to previous studies,
this paper takes into account that a reduction in market depth increases the price responsive-
ness of a given trade. Overall, we find that a transaction tax may help dampen economically
unjustified speculation. To be precise, a triple dividend may be achieved: volatility and dis-
tortion decrease while government income increases. However, there exist critical values of the
exponent g above which market stability may decrease.
It may therefore be theoretically possible that a Tobin tax worsens market efficiency.
Whether this outcome is realistic or not is an empirical question. So, how strong is the curva-
ture of the price impact function with respect to market depth? Unfortunately, no clear answer
exists. Kempf and Korn (1999), using data on DAX futures, and Plerou et al. (2002), using
data on the 116 most-frequently traded US stocks, find that the price impact function displays
a concave curvature with increasing order size, and flattening at larger values. Put differently,
the smaller is the average price impact per trade unit, the larger is the order size. Weber and
Rosenow (2003) also fitted a concave function in the form of a power law and obtained a cor-
relation coefficient of 0.977. The implications of such price impact functions have earlier been
discussed by Zhang (1999). More closely related with our setup, Lillo, Farmer and Mantenga
(2003) report that higher capitalization stocks tend to have smaller price responses for the
same (normalized) transaction size. Since market capitalization is correlated with liquidity, the
price impact function is presumbly non-linear. But the non-linearity may not be very extreme,
at least in the case of foreign exchange markets. For instance, Evans and Lyons (2002), who
estimate that $ 1 billion of net dollar purchases increases the deutsche mark price of a dollar
by 0.5 percent, could not improve their fit by including non-linarities. However, their data set
only includes about 80 daily observations. Note also that market depth in foreign exchange
71.001360 = 1.433
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markets has increased sharply since the 1970s without producing lower volatility. Put differ-
ently, if the current average daily turnover of $ 1,200 billion would decrease by, say 50 percent,
due to currency taxation, market depth would still remain extremely high. A turnover of $
600 billion - still higher than the turnover in 1989 - times a tax rate of, say 0.1 percent, would
then generate an annual tax revenue of $ 220 billion. Our simulations ignore the administrative
costs of collecting the tax as well as the dangers arising from more government control over its
citizens through the tax information.
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Legends for figures
Figure 1: The effect of the Tobin tax for τ= 1. The first, second, and third panels show the
volatility, the distortion and the tax revenue as a function of the Tobin tax for different g,
respectively. The Tobin tax is increased from 0 to 1 percent. The ”+ + +”-line, the ”× ×
×”-line and the ”⋆ ⋆ ⋆”-line stand for g= 0, g= 0.19 and g= 0.4, respectively.
Figure 2: The effect of the Tobin tax for τ= 20. The first, second, and third panels show the
volatility, the distortion and the tax revenue as a function of the Tobin tax for different g,
respectively. The Tobin tax is increased from 0 to 1 percent. The ”+ + +”-line, the ”× ×
×”-line and the ”⋆ ⋆ ⋆”-line stand for g= 0, g= 0.2 and g= 0.4, respectively.
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